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Abstract
The  establishment  of  PSI  was a  continuation  of  the  movement  of
youth groups during the period of the National Movement which the
members  came  from  intellectual  elites named  PNI  Baru.  This
organization  had  an  important  role  in  the  form  of Parliamentary
Democracy system in Indonesia.  During  independence period, PNI
Baru became  a  political  party  called  Partai  Rakyat  Sosialis (Paras),
Paras then affiliated with Partai Sosialis Indonesia (Parsi) to become the
Partai Sosialis in the late of 1945. Partai Sosialis appeared convincing as
the  dominating  party  in  the  course  of  Indonesian  politics  in  early
independence,  placing Sjahrir  and Amir as cabinet  leaders  for  five
consecutive periods. After the name of Partai Sosialis changed into PSI
on February  12,  1948,  the party  was unable  to  be  considered  as  a
potential political party anymore. PSI had no chance to contribute to
the political dynamics of Indonesia at that time. It was only after the
recognition of Indonesian sovereignty that the PSI was able to carry
out effective party work, including their involvement in cabinet in the
1950s. The PSI members were responsible of serving the government
as ministers in the structure of the Natsir Cabinet of 1950, the Wilopo
Cabinet of 1952 and Burhanuddin Harahap Cabinet of 1955, the other
figures  who  had  special  affiliation  and  sympathy  with  PSI  also
became party  representatives  to  serve  the  government  during  that
period.
Keywords: PSI; Political Dynamics; Liberal Democracy.
Introduction
The  political  dynamics  of  Indonesia  in  the  1950s  appeared  from the  struggle  of
political parties that came into being after the implementation of the parliamentary
government system in Indonesia in November 1945. The political struggle between
parties  in  the  Parliamentary  Democracy  system is  a  necessity,  but  for  politically
unstable country it might seem a worrying problem. The system often underlies the
division of political parties  in case of  ideological flows that lead to the interests in
power in each period of the cabinet or government. Almost all of political parties try
to give a big influence and play an active role in determining the cabinet photofolio,
so that in each journey the political dynamics seems quite fierce.
The  complexity  of  Indonesia's  political  conditions  and  the  intense  rivalry
between political parties at that time, was directly the trigger for the cabinet reshuffle
in  a  relatively  short  period  of  time.  Recorded  during  the  implementation  of  the
Parliamentary  Government  system  in  Indonesia  from  1945  to  1949,  it  had
experienced  seven  cabinet changes,  those  were  (i)  Sjahrir  Cabinet  I  from  Partai
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Sosisalis, (ii) Sjahrir Cabinet II from Partai Sosisalis, (iii) Sjahrir Cabinet III from Partai
Sosisalis,  (iv)  Amir  Cabinet  I  from Partai  Sosialis,  (v)  Amir Cabinet  II  from Partai
Sosialis, (vi) Hatta Cabinet I from Non-Party, and (vii) Hatta Cabinet  II from Non-
Party (Puspoyo, 2012: 40-45).
Based on that record,  it shows that in the course of the cabinet at that time  it
was only Partai Sosialis which dominated the structure of the cabinet. The dominance
of  Partai Sosialis in the five cabinet periods indicates that the party is a large and
considerable  party.  Partai  Sosialis through  its  representatives  also  succeeded  in
playing an important role in initiating policies that determine the ideal concept of
political structure in Indonesia. One of the important roles of Partai Sosialis is to fight
for democracy as political system in Indonesia.
In its development, on February 12,  1948  Partai Sosialis changed its name into
Partai Sosialis Indonesia (PSI) (Tim Buku Tempo, 2010: 215), yet for several years after
this, the party remained an influential political party on the national political stage.
PSI  briefly  sat  on  Liberal  Democracy  cabinet in  1950s,  among  them  were  Natsir
Cabinet of 1950, Wilopo Cabinet of 1952 and Burhanuddin Harahap Cabinet of 1955,
the  other  figures  who had  special  affiliation and sympathy with PSI also became
party representatives to serve the government during that period (Legge, 2003: 15). 
At the same time, PSI became an influential party in the parliament by placing
its members totaling 17 seats out of a total of 236 seats. PSI became party that had the
third most representatives  compared with  PNI which had 49 seats  and Masyumi
Party  which  had  36  seats  (Nuzar,  et.al.,  2012:  109). PSI  records on  the  national
political stage in  1950s caused  PSI  considered as  one of the major political parties.
Based on the analysis of Herbert Feith, during the period of Liberal Democracy until
the period of the Guided Democracy the typology of political parties in Indonesia
was  divided  into  five  major genres,  namely  Modernist  Islam  represented  by
Masyumi  Party,  Democratic  Socialism  represented  by  PSI,  Radical  Nationalism
represented by PNI, Javanese Traditionalism represented by NU, and Communist
represented by PKI (Feith dan Castles, 1988).
According  to  the  background of  this  study above,  the  researcher  conducted
research to perpetuate  the political struggles between parties at the time of Liberal
Democracy in Indonesia and drawn on the more specific context of the dynamics of
PSI struggles during the period of Liberal Democracy in 1950-1959.
Method
The  method  used  in  the  preparation  of  this  journal  uses  the  historical  method,
namely the process of critically testing and analyzing footage and relics of the past
(Gottschalk,  1975:  32).  This  is  an implementation  of  a  series  of  historical  writing
methodologies, namely heuristics, criticism, interpretation, and historiography.
Supporting documents  and sources  for the writing of  history,  especially in
relation to the  existence  of political parties in the 1950s, came from several places,
among others were first, the National Archives of the Republic of Indonesia (ANRI),
there  were  found  sources  of  correspondence,  regulations,  and  the  laws  and
regulations prevailing in 1950-1959. Second, the National Library of Indonesia. There
was found PSI's Articles of Basic Basis and Bylaws (AD/ART) which could be used
to determine the principles and direction of party movements. Third, the sources at
the  Surakarta  Press  Museum.  There  were  found  newspapers  rregarding  the
movements of political parties in Indonesia in 1950-1959, especially those related to
the PSI.  As a source of support the author also uses a variety of books that were
certainly related and relevant to the theme written.
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PSI Consolidation and Development Efforts 
Since the establishment to the end of Dutch rule in Indonesia, PSI tended not to show
party’s activity intensively. From 1948 to 1950, the Dutch Military Aggression and
ongoing diplomacy agendas did not provide sufficient space for PSI to engage in
partying activities, the rest of PSI's internal activities only took place in the mid-1950s
by determining the party's political program discussed in the leadership conferences
party (Fakih, 2012).
It  appeared  that  the  first  PSI  deliberation  plan  had been prepared  well  in
advance. It could be seen from the implementation which did not take long from the
recognition of Indonesian sovereignty. PSI succeeded in conducting deliberations of
party leaders held in Yogyakarta. The deliberations were held for approximately five
days and were attended by core board of  PSI such as Sjahrir, L.M. Sitorus, Djohan
Sjahroezah, Soemartojo, and Hamdani, as well as some PSI leaders from the regional
representatives (Anwar,  2011: 92).
The  deliberations  had  succeeded  in  preparing  the  Basic  Basis  and  Bylaws
(AD / ART) of the Party. PSI was a new political party with an old background that
insisted that socialism was still  used as its principle.  Chronologically, the view of
socialism was the identical ideology used as the principle of the organization of PNI
Baru since the 1931s. Despite this tendency, Sjahrir insisted that “all members of PSI
want the new party to be a party  that is  free from the burden of the past” (Legge,
2003: 230). This difference was due to changes in the national political situation in the
period before  and after independence, so that the orientation and movement of the
party must also be changed.
The  maturity  of  PSI  figures  in  determining  the  concept  of  their  party
movement through the deliberation became an interesting and strategic way for the
party's journey ahead. Furthermore, it was not long from the implementation of the
deliberation, in August 1950 they held a meeting attended by political parties based
on the  genre  and representatives  from each region in  the parliament  building to
discuss the mission in formulating government policy, especially the issue of West
Irian liberation. The composition of the mission was Andi Zainal Abidin  from PSI,
Abdul Hajat from the Labor Party, Kasima from the Catholic Party, Manai Shopian
from Non-party, Sahettapy Sogel from Protestant representative, Soekiman of Islam
representative, Moh. Tadjudin Nor from the Nationalists and Moh Yamin from Non-
party (Antara,  27 August 1950). The meeting was not related to PSI new  working
program and did not become the main focus of PSI figures. It could be seen from the
representation of PSI which was not attended by party elites, but  it clearly showed
that PSI had strong legitimacy as a representative of the socialist party.
The legitimacy of PSI was reinforced by the large number of party members in
parliament at the time. Known since in 1950 the number of PSI seats in the House of
Representatives amounted to 17 seats from a total of 232 seats. Although at this time
there  was no clear  measuring  instrument in  determining the strength of  political
parties and only based on the estimate of the establishment of the party, but PSI itself
as a party of three national political forces. PSI only lost to PNI and Masyumi Party
which each have 49 and 36 seats in the House of Represintative (Nuzar,  et.al., 2012:
109). This reason gave PSI a path to get involved in every Liberal Democratic period
cabinet journey in the 1950s.
PSI Political Activities and Struggles in the Cabinet 
Natsir Cabinet
The  new  Indonesian  journey  with  parliamentary  system  was  marked  by  the
enactment of  the Provisional  Law in August  1950.  For  the first  cabinet,  President
Soekarno immediately gave the cabinet formative mandate to Natsir as chairman of
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the Masyumi Party.1 The appointment of Natsir was a presidential award to him,
because Natsir was considered able to unite the regions through an integral motion
submitted at the House of Representative’s meeting (Waluyo, 2009: 78). For about a
month Natsir  were  communicating with other political parties, especially with PNI
and PSI, which dominated the party forces outside the Masyumi Party at that time.
Natsir's  talks with PNI had always failed, Natsir finally took a political policy by
prioritizing PSI as the party coalition cabinet.
In  early  October  1950,  Natsir  reported  the  composition  of  the  cabinet  to
President  Soekarno.  Natsir  put  three  people  from  Masyumi  Party,  M.  Roem  as
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sjafruddin Prawira Negara as Minister of Finance, and
Wakhid Hasyim as Minister of Religious Affairs. Then two people from PSI namely,
Mr. Tadiono Manu as Minister of Agriculture and Dr. Soemitro Djojohadikusumo as
Minister of Trade and Industry.  Two of PIR namely, Wongsonegoro as Minister of
Justice,  and  Prof.  Dr.  Johanes  as  Minister  of  Public  Works.  One  from  Parkindo
namely, Dr. Johanes Leimena as Minister of Health. One from Parindra R.P. Suroso
as Minister of Labor. One from PSII, Harsono Tjokroaminoto as State Minister. One
from Democrats, Pellaupessy as Minister of Information. His party was taken from
non-parties, such as Sri Sultan Hamengku Buwuno IX as Deputy Prime Minister, Mr.
Assaat as Minister of Home Affairs,  Abdul Halim as Minister of Defense; Bahder
Johan as Minister of Education.
Natsir's cabinet composition  did not demonstrate the position of PSI as the
party that dominates the cabinet structure, there were only two names of PSI cadres
in the cabinet, but PSI had an important role in the process of drafting the cabinet
structure.  It  was  shown  from  the  criticism  of  the  PSI's  political  opponents  by
cornering the Natsir  cabinet,  as  it  was featured in the daily  newspaper  Merdeka
dated September 7, 1950.
“Some  of  capable  people  in  Mohammad  Natsir's  cabinet  are  available,  such  as
Soemitro Djojohadikusumo, Bahder Johan, and Mr. Assaat, but their meaning was
diminished by Soemitro, Assat and three others in the cabinet of Abdul Halim, Tadio
Manu, and Hamengku Buwono, all in the power and influence of PSI.  Therefore,
Muhammad Natsir's cabinet is a PSI cabinet” (Harian Merdeka, 7 September 1950).
The assumption that Mr. Assaat, Abdul Halim, and Hamengku Buwono IX
were PSI people never wrong, because the fact that their close relationship with PSI
especially with Sjahrir  could  not be denied. In the theory of the Ruling Group, PSI
did not take much part in obtaining power directly, but PSI had a big hand to select
ministers in Natsir's cabinet (Duverger, 1984: 107).2
Besides,  Natsir  himself  denied  the  allegations,  he  said  he  had  a  reason in
choosing a cabinet structure based on expertise, or better known as "Zaken Cabinet".
Natsir’s statement was  denied by the opposition group who said that the term  of
Zaken Cabinet felt less appropriate when it was used as an excuse to give a position to
PSI people and set aside PNI and PKI in the cabinet structure. This caused PNI and
PKI along with the Labor Party to place themselves as an opposition party (Kahin,
1952: 134).
1In fact, President  Soekarno and Natsir  had never been in the same way. It could be
seen from every debates and arguments they both had in accordance of formulating the form
of state in the early of independence period. President Soekarno required secular state while
Natsir required Islamic state.
2In the theory of Ruling Group,  political party which had great power could be seen
from its party’s influence in placing representatives to be assigned as ministries. The Ruling
Group would not directly take the position but they did something by influencing the power.
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According to the history of  the relationship between the Masyumi Party and
PSI in the early days of independence, they had a long story of conflict. The specific
reason Natsir used to consider PSI was the cabinet's working priority. Natsir Cabinet
program  put  the  reorganization  and  rationalization  of  the  military  bureaucracy,
financial stability and increased economic activity as the main target (Feith,  1964:
153). 
It was known that PSI wass one party that had good communication with the
military  (Alam,  2003:  259),3 as  well  as  in  implementing  economic  development
programs, Natsir seeked to increase the economic income by pumping Indonesia's
main export activities, advancing agriculture and industrial production enhancers. In
that case Natsir  was  considering a competent  figure to run it,  Tandio Manu and
Soemitro.
In fact, in the implementation of its economic policy Natsir Cabinet obtained
results that were quite encouraging. National targets in Soemitro's industrial sector
had made significant improvements to the overall national economic condition. The
growth of industrial productivity had shown increasing results (Waluyo, 2009: 1952).
In managing the trading income Soemitro implemented a policy called Kurs Beraneka
(Multiple Rate),  it is  the exchange rate used for export, import and profit transfer
which  are separated. This policy made Indonesia's economic growth in early 1950
increased  (van  Bemmelen  and  Raben,  2011:  38-39).  Despite  these  successes,  the
improvement of state revenues from the trade and industry sectors on the other hand
created a new gap for the management of state finances. Corruption among customs
officials,  financial  officers,  and  state  foreign  exchange  officials  became  an
unavoidable  practice.  News  about  corruption  had been  often  reported  in various
newspapers and discussed in parliamentary meetings (van Bemmelen and Raben,
2011: 38-39).
This led to the opposition political party pressing Natsir Cabinet. Fortunately,
PIR which initially agreed with Natsir turned the direction by pulling his ministers in
the cabinet. The pressure from the opposition party caused Natsir's cabinet position
could not be maintained, then Narsir returned the mandate to the president in March
1951.
Soekiman Cabinet
A few days after Natsir returned the mandate, President Soekarno appointed PNI
representative, Mr. Sartono as a formature on April 26, 1951 (Harian Abadi, 27 Maret
1951). In arranging his cabinet, Mr. Sartono prefered to communicate with Masyumi
Party. He was assisted by Sidik Djojosukarto from PNI and Soekiman from Masyumi
Party. The results of the arrangement  chose Soekiman as Prime Minister. Soekiman
cabinet lasted until February 23, 1952, by showing a good relationship with PNI. In
his cabinet composition, Soekiman considered the representation of Masyumi Party
and PNI, while left parties including PSI were not involved in the cabinet structure at
all.
Actually  Soekiman was aware of the difference between PSI  and other left
parties, especially with PKI,  yet Soekiman did not agree with Soemitro's economic
policy at the time he served as Minister of Trade and Industry in Natsir Cabinet. In
the  economic  policy,  Soekiman  considered  Soemitro  was  more  often  having
cooperation  with  the  United  States.  While  Soekiman  himself  preferred  to  do
3PSI  had  been  known  to  be  close  to  General  Soedirman  in  the  early  period  of
independence. In the early year of  1948, PSI  was able to build up relationship with some
military such as  A.H. Nasution  as well as the soldiers. PSI  had successfully infiltrated and
proposed its modern ideas inside of military at that time. 
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economic resistance with America, and oppose the policy of American embargo for
strategic goods, textile and rubber (Alam, 2003: 258). 
According to PSI, they said that  Soekiman’s statement  could not be proven
and  only  as  a  means  to  eliminate  PSI  representatives  in  the  composition  of  his
cabinet. After  that,  PSI  seeked  to  weaken  the  cabinet  by  conducting  opposition
movements and holding other political parties. PSI  looked for alliance to  Masyumi
Party after knowing that Natsir did not walk in the same way with Soekiman. From
the internal Masyumi Party itself, Soekiman got a  contradiction. It turned out that
there were two  groups  within Masyumi Party, namely the old group whose orbit
was Soekiman himself and the young group whose orbit was Natsir. PSI decided to
cooperate  with Masyumi  Party  who sided  with Natsir  in  arranging  a  movement
against the cabinet. As results, Masyumi Party who sided with Natsir issued a vote of
no confidence and managed to overthrow Soekiman cabinet (Harian Abadi, April 28,
1951).
Wilopo Cabinet
After  Soekiman’s resignation,  President  Soekarno  appointed  a  new  cabinet
formation, this time he appointed Sidik Djojokarto from PNI and Prawoto Mangku
Saswito  from Masyumi Party, because there was no agreement between the two in
determining the cabinet formation, finally the formation mandate was returned to
President Soekarno. By President Soekarno, PNI representatives were replaced by
Wilopo. The results decided the cabinet leader must be given to Wilopo on April 3,
1952 (Noer, 1987: 260).
While deciding the composition of his cabinet, Wilopo preferred to arrange the
cabinet  based on cabinet’s  journey stability  than greater  development mission.  In
other words, Wilopo only considered the cabinet’s journey as political security. He
assumed that the failure of cabinets before was caused by effortless of the cabinets in
pointing out opposition party, so that all of parties which considered to be potential
were included to sit in the cabinet structure (Anitawati, 2009: 102).
PSI,  PNI and Masyumi Party were coalition parties,  and these three parties
were the backbone of the cabinet. During Wilopo cabinet,  PSI was able to place Mr.
Lukman Wiradinata  as  Minister  of  Justice  and Dr.  Soemitro  Djojohadikusumo as
Minister of Economy again. Fortunately, Lukman Wiradinata and Soemitro were not
seen  as part of an expert in cabinet structure at that time, although the ministerial
position corresponded to the background of their field. Soemitro was known as one
of the professors in University of Indonesia with the background of Economics and
Lukman as a legal expert. In the period of Wilopo cabinet, the two had merit only by
issuing  policies  by  reactivating  the  stock  exchange  in  Jakarta  under  the  Capital
Market  Emergency  Act  of  1952.  The  policy  did  not  bring  strategic  impact  on
economic development on a national scale. 
In  his  journey,  Wilopo  cabinet  tended  to  be  less  pressured  by  opposition
parties,  only  NU  Party  which  was  a  bit  harshly  weakening  the  cabinet,  so  that
Wilopo was able to carry out the cabinet programs smoothly. However, not long ago,
great  pressure  on Wilopo  cabinet  came from PNI itself.  This  time,  the  resistance
movement was led by Sidik Djojokarto,  by  supporting the  Serikat  Tani (Peasants'
Union) to file a vote of no confidence in the cabinet,  which affected the return of
Wilopo's mandate to the President on June 3, 1953 (Alam, 2003: 258). 
Ali Sastroamidjojo Cabinet
The political struggle in the last few cabinets showed that political conflict arose from
several causes, both from ideological conflict and interests between political parties
even conflict between groups within the party itself. President Soekarno realized it as
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a serious problem, so in the formation of a new cabinet President Soekarno took a
political  stance  by  appointing  Wongsonegoro  to  represent  PIR  to  rearrange  new
cabinet. Wongsonegoro was appointed from undominant power party at that time. It
was intended as a middle ground for the new cabinet not to be filled with political
struggles involving PNI, Masyumi and PSI.
In  arranging  the  cabinet, Wongsonegoro  took  a courageous decision by only
involving  PNI  and  Islamic  representatives  from  NU  and  PSII  party  without
involving the PSI  and Masyumi Party  in it.  In the formation of  new cabinet,  Ali
Sastroamidjodjo  was  appointed  from  PNI  as  Prime  Minister  on  August  1,  1953
(Alam, 2003: 312). 
PSI  and  Masyumi  Party  felt  as  neglected  parties  after  abandoned  in  the
arrangement  of the  cabinet,  therefore  both  of  them  decided  to  do  weakening
movement  to  the cabinet. PSI encouraged the Masyumi Party to re-engage Islamic
parties  into  the  formation as  it  was  before  the  1950s.  They  did  agitation  activity
reported in newspaper  Harian  Abadi on September 8, 1953, Masyumi Party gave a
judgement to NU party and PSII as parties that injured the Islamic struggle (Harian
Abadi, September 8,  1953). Meanwhile, PSI itself, also did protest  to the existence of
two names of PKI  representatives  who  sat in the cabinet,  Yamin and Ali (Ricklef,
2005: 489). Then, the movement of PSI and Masyumi Party finally got supports from
NU and PSII Party to make efforts weaken the cabinet. The opposition coalition was
successfully  able to make Ali cabinet returned its mandate to the President on July
20, 1954.
Burhanuddin Harahap Cabinet
More than a year of Ali Cabinet's resignation, a new cabinet had not yet been formed.
The government  felt so  frustrated with the political work of the cabinet that rarely
formulated strategic programs in the case of state development, instead it was filled
with contradictions between party streams with problematic requirements. This was
due to the existence of a balanced party power, so as to map the power between
political parties, it was taken by election. Finally on August  11,  1955 a new cabinet
was formed, led by Burhanudin Harahap from Masyumi Party. Burhanudin Harahap
cabinet was the cabinet assigned to hold the first election in Indonesia.
In  the  effort  to  carry  out  his  duties,  Burhanuddin  Harahap  chose  to
accommodate the representation of all the parties that had potential  and significant
vote in the election, namely PNI, Masyumi Party, PSI, PKI, and Parkindo (Puspoyo,
2012: 69). Finally, by the representation of the whole party, the target of the election
in 1955 could be conducted smoothly. The goal was proven, Burhanuddin Harrahap
cabinet could perform a democracy stage one month after its appointment.
Government Implementation After the General Election
In 1955, general election was held and the result was only announced in March 1956.
PSI hardly accepted  the  results,  because  as the party suffered a landslide defeat,  it
only earned about two percent of the national vote. In other words, PSI  could only
delegate  5  representatives  to  the  House  of  Representative  and  10  seats  to  the
members  of  the Constutuante.  Many arguments  tried  to explain the cause of  the
defeat, but Sjahrir himself as chairman of PSI chose to be wise in realizing that maybe
PSI was not mature enough in calculating the strength of the electorate base (Anwar,
2011: 98). 
The result of the vote also influenced the political map of the new cabinet after
Burhanuddin Harahap returned his mandate in March 1956. In the formation of the
new  cabinet,  President  Sukarno  used  his  prerogative  to  appoint  four  election-
winning political parties, so the formation consisted of PNI, Masyumi Party, NU and
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PKI representatives. This action was taken by President  Soekarno  as an attempt to
create  a  more  conducive  cabinet  composition,  otherwise  the  political  struggle
between parties was still apparent at the time of the first cabinet preparation after the
1955 elections. It was marked by the Masyumi Party's refusal of PKI to participate in
the formation (Harian Abadi, March 5, 1956). Finally, the process was carried out by
PNI, Masyumi Party,  and NU Party with the result  of putting Ali Sastroamidjojo
back as Prime Minister, known as the Ali Cabinet II.
Even though PSI  with the election results of 1955 had to accept the fact that
they could not do much in influencing the cabinet, PSI seemed to support the Ali
Cabinet program, and did not carry out opposition or provocation movements as
they did on the cabinet’s journey before the election was held. It was according to the
awareness  of  PSI  members  on  the  strength  of  his  party,  there  was  no  precise
instrument used to carry out  to  weaken the cabinet. In such situations, forcing the
party  members  temporarily  to  withdraw  any  action  in  the  national  political
dynamics, and possible activity to be carried out was conducting the party's internal
agendas.
Whilst the  political  condition  in  Indonesia  at  the  beginning  of  1957  again
pointed to the difficult dynamics, Ali Cabinet II problems arose after the relationship
between PNI and Masyumi Party again showed bad communication. The crack in the
relationship  between  the  two  was  then  used  by  PKI.  By  using  his  political
maneuvers, PKI succeeded in shifting Masyumi Party by rallying the ballot, and it
was proven by Masyumi Party taking out its five representatives in the cabinet. The
ongoing struggle  between  the two forced  Ali  to  return  his  mandate  to  President
Sukarno (Puspoyo, 2012: 70).
The complexity of the political journey at that  time forced the president to
rethink  in  continuing  the  parliamentary  democracy  system,  but  president  still
compromised with the demands of  most political  parties  to  continue the system.
Half-heartednessly  and  without  pointing  out  representative  to  arrange  the  new
formation, President directly appointed Djuanda from non-party as Prime Minister.
Djuanda Cabinet was the last cabinet in the history of Liberal Democracy period in
Indonesia. This Cabinet  was referred to as a cabinet of works, which in the cabinet
formation  consisted  of  professional  people,  not  the  result  of  the  party  coalition
(Puspoyo, 2012: 79). Representatives who sat in the cabinet structure at this time was
based on recommendation of President Soekarno, not because of the consideration of
the strength of political parties.
In  Djuanda  Cabinet,  PSI  actually  lost  the  instrument  to  sit  in the  cabinet
structure. PSI position was cornered after indications of involvement of one of the
party members in PRRI rebellion in West Sumatra,  it caused PSI completely lost its
name among the National Political elites.
Conclusion
The establishment of PSI was a continuation of the movement of youth groups who
came  from  the  intellectual  elites who  joined  PNI  Baru  organization  during  the
National  Movement.  In  the  early  days  of  independence of  Indonesia,  the
organization had an important role in the birth of Parliamentary Democracy system
and  pointed  Sjahrir  as  the  first  Prime  Minister.  At  about  the  same  time,  this
organization was transformed into a political party called the  Partai Rakyat Sosialis
(Paras).
The position of Paras was taken into account after  getting collaboration with
Partai Sosialis Indonesia (Parsi)  led by Amir Sjarifuddin to fuse into Socialist Party at
the end of 1945. It  was proven that since its establishment until 1947 Socialist Party
came to  dominate  in  Indonesian  politics  by  placing  Sjahrir  and  Amir  as  cabinet
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leaders during five consecutive periods. It was the time when Socialist Party played
an important  role  in  advocating Indonesia's  sovereignty from the  Dutch side,  by
taking a rational path which was diplomacy. This brilliant attitude demonstrated by
Socialist Party was able to inspire Hatta Cabinet to fight in the same way until the
achievement of Indonesian sovereignty in 1949.
After the name of Socialist Party changed  into PSI on February 12, 1948, the
party was unable to emerge as a  considerable  political party. PSI did not have the
opportunity to appear in the political dynamics of Indonesia at that time.  But then
after the recognition of Indonesia's sovereignty, PSI was able to carry out its effective
party works, including in involving itself on the cabinet's journey. In the 1950s PSI
representatives  were believed to occupy positions as ministers  in the structure of
Natsir  Cabinet,  Wilopo  Cabinet,  as  well  as  Burhanuddin  Harahap  Cabinet.  In
addition, it put PSI back as a considerable political party in Indonesia.
The achievement of PSI as one of the most influential parties in the Indonesian
political  stage of the 1950s did not last long. PSI was unable to create an effective
organizational movement in increasing mass power in the 1955 elections, because it
only got two percent of the vote or 5 seats in parliament among 17 seats in the early
1950s.  The loss of  base  of  representatives  party  in  the  parliament  resulted in the
decline of party positions on the way of the entire cabinet from 1956 to 1959.
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